Back to the Future for Fiji

Last year I conducted a research paper on Fiji for my Pacific Policy paper, in September-October, during the build-up to the Dec 6. coup-de'tat.

It was titled "Why are further coups likely in Fiji?".
It got a pretty reasonable grade (A-), and I thought people might like to read it, in hindsight of what has happened since, so I am posting it on here.

"

Introduction

“Fiji, the way the world should be[1]”.“Fiji consists of about 300 islands situated in the South Pacific, approximately between 1770 to 2414 kilometres south of the equator. The total landmass of the group is approximately 18,376 square kilometres over spread over a much larger ocean region. The two largest islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu make up approx 87% of this total land area.[2]”

This is the Fiji that most tourists are familiar with, a kind of tropical existence less Americanised than Hawaii, but big enough to bother doing business with, the Fiji that its rulers want you to see. But there is a Problem with Paradise.

Since independence, Fiji has been governed largely by a coalition of civil servants and the vestiges of chiefly authority, with a veneer of democracy. Until 1987, the Alliance Party had a stronghold, and since then short periods of multi-ethnic democracy have been overthrown by military elements led by ambitious individuals seeking to restore the status-quo-ante, which in time occurred.

This recurring cycle of military intervention followed by interim civilian administrations, and then the re-election of those governments has and continues to set dangerous precedents within Fijian society. In fact, a majority of Fijian population is denied access to the rule of law and due process, not to mention their right to dismiss leadership they view as corrupt or incompetent, and discard ideas that they perceive as divisive.

This paper will attempt to establish some reasoning behind the coups, historical influences, what motivated the plotters, and determine, whether, and perhaps “why, further coups are likely in Fiji.”

Impact of the Pre-Independence Eras

Pre-Contact

As a result of settlement by Polynesians and Melanesians, Fiji, as one might expect, prior to the arrival of British colonists, was congruent with many other Pacific societies, with a traditional form of government, derived from chiefly authority. Therefore, political structure of tribes/vanua is analogous to that of the Maori in New Zealand, see Fig. 1.

Fig .1 – Political Structure of the Traditional Chiefly System (Fiji)

N.B. (not available to online readers)

The chief mechanism employed to enable leaders to exercise chiefly authority was kinship. Each small group had a chief, “who had the definite right, subject to varying conditions, to make decisions on all matters affecting the groups as whole” Furthermore, in order to exercise authority effectively, a chief had to be able to satisfy requests from his people for material assistance. This is the way the chief gained prestige, superiority, and continued loyalty from his subjects.”[3]

There in fact remains a high degree support for this style of governance, perhaps in part as a response to continuing political instability within Fiji. A large proportion of the indigenous Fijian population still reside within the traditional village environment, and therefore believe a system which more formally institutionalises chiefly authority is required.

Contact to Colonial

At the time of Western contact, Fiji was divided into seven vanua: Lakeba in Lau, Cakaudrove, Macuata, and Bua in Vanua Levu; Bau, Rewa, and Verata in south-east Viti Levu ”.[4] Inter-tribal warfare over territory and other grievances was common. The arrival of Europeans also undoubtedly prompted a period of political consolidation, this was as much an opportunistic exercise in conquest, facilitated by the arrival of European technology and weaponry, than any attempt to thwart European encroachment. Much territory was brought under the control of a single vanua, Bau, whose high chief, Cakobau asserting claims of “matanitu”, once establishing pre-eminence, proclaimed himself “Tui Viti”, or King of Fiji.[5]

But by, and large there was little desire or attempts at political centralisation in this period. People still identified mainly with their vanua[6], rather than as ethnic “Fijian”.

Many indigenous Fijians still identify themselves in this way, having a stronger sense of tribal affiliation than ethnic nationality. Many Indo-Fijians, ironically for those within the Taukei movement, identify more strongly as ‘Fijian’ than their indigenous cousins do. Remembering though, that nationalism is a late construct, even in European political development, and many indigenous Fijian chiefs were largely accepting of European control as it enhanced their own ability to coerce.

Colonial Rule

Various attempts were made at establishing a centralised form of governance, based on a combination of British and indigenous law. However, it wasn’t until October 10, 1874, that Fiji was officially annexed by Britain, ostensibly for reasons of “protecting the interests of British colonists” and pre-empting “the possibility of American annexation due to the insolvency of the Tui Viti to the United States Government”[7].

As part of the agreement in which they ceded sovereignty, the chiefs obliged Britain not only to protect the interests of the colonists, but as now British subjects, protecting the ‘Fijian way of life’ was to be observed.[8] The British were happy to accept this agreement, as it allowed for the colonial administration to rest upon the strata of local government that already existed, and with that came perception of legitimacy.

It was therefore “imperative [for the colonial government] to preserve ‘ancient Fijian traditions’ against the destructive impact of the West”. However, this determination, coupled with a substantially reduced indigenous population as a result of high susceptibility to foreign disease, impacted on the ability of the European cotton and sugar plantation owners to attract labour. It was therefore decided, following the examples of Mauritius and Trinidad that indentured labourers would be imported from India, to provide a work-force, and the first group arrived in 1879. When the system ended in 1916, there were 60,000 labourers[9] who decided to stay on, mostly as small lease-hold farmers who continued to produce sugar-cane. With the indigenous Fijians remaining largely within their villages, excepting a small number of civil servants, there was little need or desire for contact between the Indo-Fijians and their indigenous counter-parts. This enabled the development of negative stereotyping, and this perception of difference was a far greater effect in promoting indigenous nationalism and unity than any other factor.

The colonial administration had therefore fostered the development of a pluralistic society, and while employing a strategy of “divide and rule” may have been practical during the colonial era, it neglected to view the consequences and lessons learnt from the independence of another British possession, Palestine.

Role of the Military Within Society

Contemporary Role

The role that military forces are expected to perform is to be the sole institution capable of legitimate coercion with society. This is one of the fundamental assertions upon which the security of all states, be they democratic or autocratic, rests.

The contemporary Westminster democratic political order, one which could be defined to be existence since the Reform Act of 1832 in the UK[10], which arguably first gave popular sovereignty under a universal franchise (women were however excluded). Since then, combining these two proviso has not preceded without difficulty, but the unwritten political convention seems to be ‘that while the military is technically under the control of the Commander in Chief/Head of State’, that ‘it would act in a subservient manner to the will of the popularly elected government’. “The role of the military is to resist aggression and to aid the civil power maintaining the peace. Thereby, modern militaries in almost every democratic nation are severely restricted from any lead role in the affairs of the nation[11]”. This arguably, is one of the most important factors in allowing democracy to exist, as it effectively puts the control of the military into the hands of the leadership of the House of Commons.

Military Government

However, perhaps unsurprisingly, this has not always proved to be the case, especially in countries in which democratic rule was one of the last requirements of the former colonial power, therefore inevitably poisoned by association. Military government has been relatively common in post-colonial societies. It is often argued that this is a legacy of colonial ‘nation’ policy, as certain groups/tribes/elites were at one time favoured and encouraged to collaborate with colonial administrators, and upon independence, these are the groups who were left in charge, and they had the most to lose from a democratic transition to a more transparent successor regime. The elites that may feel threatened by the loss, or the potential for loss of kickbacks and or privileges granted under the previous era, and perhaps also the likelihood of legal proceedings relating to either the nature of their collaboration and rule.

Even when civilian and/democratic government is eventually restored, there remains a certain unwillingness to combat the power of the military, especially in the immediate to short term. Governments remain hostage to the will of the military leadership, presenting a puppet regime, whereas the ‘real power behind the throne’ remains in the hands of the military. Threats to civilian politicians and whistleblowers are used to buy compliance. In these countries, while the military commander acts upon requests by the elected leadership, the military itself usually becomes politicised as means for last-resort[12]. Therefore, it seems that the states which are most likely to suffer in the future from some form of military intervention, are those which have a history of such occurrences.

Example: Fiji

The role of military in Fiji, however has arguably become a much more powerful instrument than 1987 coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka intended when he took power. The role in which he, and subsequent long-term FMF Commander Commodore ‘Frank’ Voreqe Bainimarama have presented themselves as playing, was as the protector of the nation. It seems that they have had little interest in ruling themselves, perhaps excluding Rabuka’s ego and its desire for prestige – preferring to leave the day to day running of the country to the various bureaucrats and other officials. But instead, they used their ability to coerce, to create a self-appointed authority, in unofficially which the role of the military commander is extended, ostensibly “to preserve national unity”, and also to unilaterally determine under which circumstances such action would be required.

This role does require an ability to maintain strict discipline in military personnel and a certain charisma in order to ensure loyalty.

Behaviour of Elites/Political Actors

Issues of contention

There are several issues which have been mentioned in the past as justifications for grievances against governments.

Democracy: The indigenous Fijians elites have long viewed the Indo-Fijian population as a destabilising influence to their control over the political sphere, as they were independent, unlike the village-based indigenous population, who would return their local chief without question. In the past, there has been rumours of an unofficial understanding about the role of Indo-Fijians within the politics of the Fijian state, in which indigenous Fijians would dominate the government and civil service, and Indo-Fijians would be paramount in the business and trade professions[13]. However, this kind of arrangement was an imposed solution rather than anything negotiated. The large number of Cabinet ministers in the 1987 Coalition and 1999 People’s Coalition government was seen as ‘a violation of this hoary provision’.

Land Reform: The indigenous population has maintained ownership over the vast majority of arable land within Fiji, yet the Indo-Fijians are those who farm it. In recent years, many farms upon which the Indo-Fijians have lived and worked, have come up for lease re-newel for the first time since independence. During the colonial era, rentals were regulated, and set at rates far below that of the market, at peppercorn rentals, so when the leases have lapsed, many indigenous owners – who own the land collectively – and view it as inalienable have either decided to take possession of the land for their own purposes, raise rentals to that many multiples of the prior arrangement, or lease the hand to developers for tourist hotel development. This has led to a huge degree of insecurity for the Indo-Fijian farmers, who have long requested that the government allow them to buy land at a fair price.

Political Communalism: These above issues, along with ethnic stereotyping that developed during the colonial era has led to division with Fiji. All of the post-1970 constitutions have reinforced that division to a degree, because of their provision for ethnically based seats. This has encouraged political parties to also adopt communalist policies, and allowed opposition parties to portray their opponents, correctly or incorrectly, as pandering to the interests of their ‘race’, for example Mahendra Chaudhry’s Labour-led administration was criticized as being too close to the interests of the Indo-Fijian farmers – Mahen was at the stage a member of the National Farmers Union[14] (dominated by Indo-Fijian lease-holders), and not being respectful to indigenous custom (antagonistic to the Great Council of Chiefs). Both the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) and the Nationalist Federation Party (NFP) campaign nearly exclusively along communalist lines.

Political Corruption

Since independence, the living standards of a majority of indigenous Fijians has dropped dramatically, while a wealthy few have benefited hugely from their access to possession and privilege. The Indo-Fijian population has largely maintained its standard of living, with the exception of a few individuals who through thrift and luck managed to become wealthy business owners.

The anger of indigenous Fijians, however, instead of being directed at those which have ruled them, is usually directed at the Indo-Fijian population who are viewed as living in relative comfort. They perceive the conflict ethnically in zero-sum terms, which is largely unjustified and incorrect. A certain group of indigenous Fijian elites have fostered this resentment, so that they may pick up the pieces of the Indo-Fijian businesses, and in order to perpetuate their control of the state apparatus.

The Current Difficulties

The current commander of the Fijian military, Commodore ‘Frank’ Voreqe Bainimarama was the commander of the Fijian Military during the 2000 coup. While he was not involved with the coup, he ‘could see how some of his military officers may become involved’. Ironically, the rebel military unit was the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW), which was set up by Rabuka to counter future coup attempts, and was led by former British SAS commando Ilisoni Ligari[15]. After the release of the parliamentary hostages, which was negotiated by the ‘Muanikau Accord[16]’, which also included amnesty for Speight and his supporters, and a constitutional review, in return for also returning the Army’s weaponry, Speight’s supporters continued to menace parts of the capital, and when they were observed to still be in possession of Army firearms, Bainimarama ordered them arrested, and thereby invalidating the Muanikau Accord. Speight supporters were outraged, including some within the greater military, and later that year, soldiers at the Queen Elizabeth II Barracks mutinied in an attempt to assassinate the Commodore because of his ‘violation of the terms of Muanikau Accord’[17]. Several soldiers were killed, and Bainimarama was forced to escape from the barracks.

Those direct involved in the 2000 coups, and the subsequent mutiny at the QEII Barracks in Suva were charged with mutiny, sedition, and treason - most were convicted. The military leadership has been forceful in its determination to deal with those it views as a threat. The interim Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase that the Commodore appointed in 2001 to return the country to civilian rule was re-elected in 2001, and recently in May 2006 as the head of the SDL, successor to Rabuka’s SVT which fell apart after its disastrous result in the 1999 election. His government has sought to incorporate Speight supporters, so it could run and win on a strong indigenous communal vote. In return for this, the Speight supporters now within the SDL have pushed for lenient treatment of those convicted in the 2000 coup. This process has taken the form of a Bill within the Fiji Parliament named “Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill”[18], which is bitterly opposed by the military, which has threatened to depose Qarase’s government if it is passed. In the 2006 elections, Bainimarama explicitly backed the Fiji Labour Party, which also opposes the bill.

Conclusion/Commentary

In line with Bainimarama’s position on the “Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill” it seems likely that there be another coup, especially the Qarase government calls his bluff and passes the bill. But Fiji itself has much wider problems than those that will be faced during the term of the current Qarase administration. It has to deal with rampant corruption with the civil sector, the downturn in the business environment following the coup in 2000, and the increasing impoverishment of its self-avowed constituency, the indigenous Fijian.

If the indigenous elite refuse to give up the power they believe they are entitled to, the result will be continued impoverishment, migration of skilled labour to other countries and a likelihood of further bloodshed. The belief that a coup is an acceptable method of changing the government in the eyes of some elites to retain a government that is sympathetic to their interests must be quashed forever. They must abandon their ideology of Taukeism and institutionalised indigenous supremacy, and view the economic development of the Fijian economy as a positive-sum game. Until that happens, Fiji will be stuck in a political morass, whether that means more coups – that is for the powers that be to decide.

---

[1] Fiji Visitors Bureau – USP Book Centre – http link.

[2] P45 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[3] P47-48 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[4] P47-48 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[5] However, this was in name only, and largely did not carry any weight in areas outside his suzerainty - P50– The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[6] P46– The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[7] P52-53 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[8] P54 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[9] P64 – The Developmental Fijian State and the Politics of Development Discourse

[10] Search Wikipedia: “Reform Act of 1832”

[11] p45, Quoting “Ackland (1967)”, ‘Tradition, Lotu & Militarism in Fiji.’

[12] Re-appointments, dismissals and sackings, can all prompt coups.

[13] P41-42, Tradition, Lotu, & Militarism in Fiji

[14] P75 - Multiculturalism & Reconciliation in an Indulgent Republic: – Fiji After the Coups: 1987-1998.

[15] P77, Speight of Violence – Inside Fiji’s 2000 coup

[16] P204, , Speight of Violence – Inside Fiji’s 2000 coup

[17] P243, , Speight of Violence – Inside Fiji’s 2000 coup

[18] Search Wikipedia: “Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill”

"